Arguing Conductively or Arguing Strategically? by Xie, Yun
University of Windsor 
Scholarship at UWindsor 
OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 11 
May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM 
Arguing Conductively or Arguing Strategically? 
Yun Xie 
Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-sen University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Xie, Yun, "Arguing Conductively or Arguing Strategically?" (2016). OSSA Conference Archive. 91. 
https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA11/papersandcommentaries/91 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Conferences and Conference Proceedings at 
Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized 
conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact scholarship@uwindsor.ca. 
 Bondy, P., & Benacquista, L. (Eds.). Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias: Proceedings of the 11th International 
Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), 18-21 May 2016. Windsor, ON: OSSA, 
pp. 1-10. 
 
Arguing Conductively or Arguing Strategically? 
 
YUN XIE 
Instute of Logic and Cognition  
Sun Yat-Sen Univertsity 
Guangzhou, China 
Xieyun6@mail.sysu.edu.cn 
 
Abstract: This paper argues that conductive arguments could be understood from a rhetorical perspective. It is 
contended that conductive arguments can be regarded as a particular mode of strategic maneuvering, rather than a new 
type of argument. Moreover, it demonstrates that the use of conductive arguments can be adequately analyzed and 
evaluated by adopting the theoretical tools developed in the extended Pragma-Dialectics. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The topic of conductive argument has attracted much attention in recent argumentation studies. 
Following Wellman (1971) and Govier (1979; 1987), some informal logicians strive to justify 
conductive arguments as “an overlooked type of defeasible reasoning” (Blair & Johnson, 2011). 
They contend that conductive arguments should be treated as a new type of argument because of 
its special mechanism of justification and its particularly complex structure, both of which are 
calling for some new theory and methods for their analysis and evaluation. However, the notion of 
conduction has also its dissenters, who believe that the distinctiveness of conduction as an 
argument type is simply a myth (Possin, 2012), or the notion of conductive arguments is only a 
misconception, hence their existence is not possible at all (Alder, 2013). Now the controversy on 
conductive arguments remains unsettled (Govier, 2011; Blair, 2013; Xie & Xiong, 2013; Blair 
2015), but most of the existing disputes are centered on a logical or epistemological perspective.  
This paper offers an alternative point of view, namely a pragma-dialectical point of view, 
regarding the likelihood and importance of conductive arguments. The basic position to be argued 
against is that conductive argument can be analyzed in an adequate way from a rhetorical 
perspective. More specifically, it attempts to show that, rather than imposing a new argument 
typology and searching for some new theory, we could simply treat conductive arguments as a 
particular form of strategic maneuvering. And the theoretical tools pertaining to the analysis and 
evaluation of strategic maneuvering could be well employed in explaining and assessing 
conductive arguments. 
 
2. The concept of conductive argument 
 
The concept of conductive argument has always been traced back to Carl Wellman and his 
Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics (1971). In that book, Wellman claimed to have 
identified a type of argument that is neither deductive nor inductive: 
 
Conduction can best be defined as that sort of reasoning in which 1) a conclusion 
about some individual case 2) is drawn non-conclusively 3) from one or more 
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premises about the same case 4) without any appeal to other cases. (Wellman, 
1971, p. 52) 
 
Although conductive argument has been further distinguished into three “patterns” 
(Wellman, 1971, pp. 55-57), only the third one has received much attention from argumentation 
scholars:  
 
The third pattern of conduction is that form of argument in which some 
conclusion is drawn from both positive and negative considerations. In this pattern 
reasons against the conclusion are included as well as reasons for it. For example 
‘in spite of a certain dissonance, that piece of music is beautiful because of its 
dynamic quality and its final resolution’ or ‘although your lawn needs cutting, you 
ought to take your son to the movies because the picture is ideal for children and 
will be gone by tomorrow.’ (Wellman, 197, p. 57)  
 
This pattern of conduction is also known as “balance-of-consideration argument” or “pro 
and con argument”. It becomes the representative form of conductive argument in later 
discussions, for it is only in this pattern that we could find the special mechanism of justification 
and the complex argument structure that seems to be attractively novel. In this paper I am also 
concerned with this third pattern of conductive argument, and take it to be identical to “balance-
of-consideration argument” and “pro and con argument”.  
It is an undeniably true that in many occasions when we argue for a view on issues that are 
controversial, besides providing some reasons to support our conclusion, we do try to introduce 
some reasons that go against the conclusion. This common phenomenon is now to be captured by 
the concept of conductive argument. The beauty of conductive argument, then, lies in the fact that 
there is no other type of argument which explicitly collects both affirmative and negative reasons 
bearing on the conclusion into a single structure, and thereby indicates that the conclusion is 
reached in a way of weighing and balancing, a procedure that is commonly used for reaching a 
certain view on some unsettled issue. Accordingly, for the advocates of conductive arguments, the 
recognition and inclusion of counter-considerations in a conductive argument thus challenges our 
traditional theories for argument analysis and evaluation: it reveals our ignorance of a 
longstanding way of arguing (prevailing in some special contexts); it enriches our understanding 
of non-deductive support; it troubles our former definitions of “reason” and “premise”; and it calls 
for some new theory for its analysis and evaluation, especially, a method to pin down its argument 
structure and a theory to unpack the mechanism of outweighing. Meanwhile, the recognition of 
conduction as a new argument type would also broaden the scope of our argumentation studies. 
According to Blair (2011), there are now several broad questions about conduction that need to be 
explored, each of which also harbors several others: (1) issues of definition, (2) issues of 
conceptualization, (3) issues of analysis, (4) issues of assessment, and (5) issues of originality and 
connection (p. 1). 
 
3. A rhetorical perspective on conduction 
 
All these issues seem to be quite novel and promising, but I still have some doubt about the 
concept of conduction per se that is primarily related to the possible role of counter-considerations 
in our acts of arguing. Many proponents of conductive arguments have just presumed that the 
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presence of counter-considerations needs to be interpreted from a logical perspective: that is, they 
are provided as (part of) reasons or premises, or they have played a substantial role in justifying 
the conclusion. In this connection, they believe that the presence of counter-considerations 
indicates a need to formulate some implicit “on-balance premise”, and thereby adds some 
complication in argument structure. However, I suspect that there is an inferential leap taken from 
the argumentative practices to our argumentation theory: even though we do mention some 
counter-considerations in arguing, it is not clear that we are doing so exactly for logical concerns. 
In other words, the mentioning of a counter-consideration doesn’t necessarily mean that the arguer 
accepts it as a point relevant to the establishment of his conclusion. And yet there still seems to be 
a lack of evidence or argument for us to safely assume this connection. Therefore, it could also be 
possible to interpret the presence of counter-considerations from a perspective other than logical.  
Why do we care to mention some counter-consideration that actually has the potential to 
undermine our claim to be argued for? In reality, the inclusion of counter-considerations in a 
conductive argument is often realized by the use of “even though”, “although”, “notwithstanding”, 
or “nevertheless” clauses. Hence the answer to that question could probably be highlighted by 
examining the pragmatics of those linguistic indicators. It goes without saying that the uses of 
those even-though-like clauses are definitely parts of the speaker’s communicative intent, trying to 
convey something more than that “the conclusion is established by reasons supporting it”. They 
could, from a Gricean point of view, serve to convey the conventional implications that “these 
reasons against the conclusion are outweighed”, and that “the speaker has taken account of not just 
favorable considerations, but unfavorable ones as well” (Adler, 2013, p. 247). Moreover, when 
these conventional implications are indeed recognized by the hearer, it could also have some 
practical effects on the speaker’s argument. Specifically, by implying that the reasons against the 
conclusion are outweighed, the argument advanced would appear to be more persuasive, and by 
indicating that both favorable and unfavorable considerations are taken into account, the 
conclusion to be reached would appear to be more solid. Actually, this speculation has already 
been verified, to some extent, by research evidence in the field of communication studies. It was 
reported by the works on message sidedness that the inclusion of counter-considerations will boost 
the communicator’s credibility and thereby enhance the message’s effectiveness, though in 
complicated ways within different contexts (cf. O’Keefe, 1999). 
However, it is worth noting that neither the conveying of the above conventional 
implications, nor the achieving of those practical effects, would necessarily require the arguer to 
take counter-considerations as reasons or premises pertaining to the establishment of conclusion. 
Alternatively, it is possible to interpret the arguer’s communicative intention so as to strengthen 
her argument, not in a way of enhancing its justificatory power, but in a way that mainly increases 
its persuasive effect, i.e., makes the argument much easier to induce the adherence of audience. I 
would like to call this interpretation a rhetorical perspective on conduction, simply because it 
regards the presenting of counter-considerations as some sort of effort aiming for rhetorical 
concerns to achieve better persuasiveness.  
In fact, this rhetorical interpretation on conduction has also its origin in the analysis of 
“although” and “even though” expressions made by logicians and linguists. Hansen (2011) has 
provided a brief review on former views on the “even-though relation” (pp. 2-48), in which we 
could find that logicians like Quine have believed that “consideration of ‘but’ and 
‘although’……brings out a distinction between what may be called the logical and the rhetorical 
aspects of language” (p. 43). There Hansen (2011) further discussed Ducrot’s and Adler’s 
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pragmatic analysis on the use of “even” expressions, and by the end he himself also concluded that 
the use of “even though”, as a conjunction, has its rhetorical roles (p. 47). 
 
4. Conductive argument and strategic maneuvering 
 
Taking this rhetorical perspective on conduction, the persuasiveness of conductive arguments then 
can be explained in such a way that the reasons supporting the conclusion are offered to justify the 
conclusion, while the counter-considerations are (or recognized to be) provided by the arguer in 
order to better achieve effectiveness in persuading the audience. Hence in a conductive argument, 
the pursuits of two relatively different aims are delicately accomplished at the same time in simply 
one argumentative move. Understanding conductive argument in this way, then, could easily bring 
to our mind a parallel between conductive argument and the pragma-dialectical notion of strategic 
maneuvering. 
Over the last decade, van Eemeren and his colleagues have developed the standard 
Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation into an extended version, in which a notion of 
strategic maneuvering was put forward as the primary theoretical tool (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 
2002; van Eemeren, 2010). Basically, it is an attempt to further strengthen the connection of their 
theoretical framework with reality, by exploring more comprehensive analytic and evaluative tools 
to account for the phenomenon of strategic design in real-life argumentative practice. According 
to pragma-dialecticians, strategic design refers to an more realistic reconstruction and assessment 
of argumentation. In a nutshell, it could be easily recognized that “people engaged in 
argumentative discourse are characteristically oriented toward resolving a difference of 
opinion…[by] maintaining certain critical standards of reasonableness…At the same time, 
however, these people are also, and perhaps even primarily, interested in resolving the difference 
of opinion effectively in favor of their case” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 39). But there is an inherent 
tension in their pursuing these two objectives simultaneously, because even though the two 
endeavors are supposed to go together, in many cases they may not. Accordingly, in making an 
argumentative move, an arguer will have to maneuver strategically to reconcile her pursuit of 
effectiveness with the maintenance of reasonableness, i.e., to try to keep the balance between 
them. 
The notion of strategic maneuvering is therefore designed to capture those “continual 
efforts made in all moves that are carried out in argumentative discourse to keep the balance 
between reasonableness and effectiveness” (van Eemeren, 2010, p.40). In general, it provides us 
with an analytic instrument to deal with the fact that arguers would normally try to move toward 
the best position in view of the argumentative circumstances by some clever and skillful planning 
(van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 40-41). Adopting this notion of strategic maneuvering then adds a 
rhetorical dimension to the standard theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics. For one thing, the 
pursuit of effectiveness is now positively re-valued, and properly accommodated, within the 
dialectical framework; for another, the examination of strategic maneuvering overlaps with the 
studies in traditional areas of rhetoric, and benefits substantially from classic and modern 
rhetorical insights. In particular, in order to provide a precise characterization, three aspects of 
strategic maneuvering are distinguished, all of which are associated with distinct types of choices: 
(1) the choice made from the available “topical potential”, i.e., “the repertoire of options for 
making an argumentative move that are at the arguer’s disposal in a certain case and at a particular 
point in the discourse”, (2) the choice of how to adapt the argumentative move to meet “audience 
demand”, i.e., “the requirements pertinent to the audience that is to be reached”, and (3) the 
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exploitation of “presentational devices”, which involves “a choice as to how the argumentative 
moves are to be presented in the way that is strategically best” (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 93-94). 
These aspects are inseparable; they always go together and are represented in every argumentative 
move. Therefore, they will serve as the basic theoretical tools for analyzing strategic maneuvering 
carried out in any argumentative discourse. 
Seeing from the perspective of strategic design, the use of a conductive argument could 
also be regarded as an effort intentionally made by the arguer in order to achieve both 
effectiveness and reasonableness at the same time. The reasons for the conclusion are adduced 
obviously for the sake of maintaining reasonableness, because otherwise the conclusion cannot be 
accepted as justified, and the act would never be recognized as arguing. Meanwhile, some counter-
considerations have been mentioned with an aim to achieve an optimal effectiveness in persuading 
the audience, because when considerations against the conclusion are deliberately juxtaposed with 
reasons for the conclusion, it implicitly employs some mechanism to enhance the arguer’s chances 
of persuading the others. This similarity, then, opens a possibility for us to understand conductive 
arguments simply as a mode of strategic maneuvering, and to analyze and evaluate them using the 
theoretical tools pertinent to the notion of strategic maneuvering. 
 
5. Conductive argument as a mode of strategic maneuvering: Its analysis 
 
In the extended Pragma-dialectics, strategic maneuvering takes place not only in “all discussion 
stages”, but also in “all the individual moves” in the course of resolving a difference of opinion 
(van Eemeren, 2010, p. 45). Every instance of strategic maneuvering will be categorized into one 
of the four classes, based on the stage in which it takes place: confrontational maneuvering, 
opening maneuvering, argumentational maneuvering, and concluding maneuvering. Each of these 
four classes “encompasses a variety of specific modes of strategic maneuvering whose make-up is 
instrumentally attuned to realizing the dialectical and rhetorical aims pertinent to the discussion 
stage the arguers are in” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 46). In accordance with this framework, 
conductive arguments would be simply regarded as a particular mode of argumentational 
maneuvering, for any use of a conductive argument will be reconstructed as part of the 
argumentation stage, more specifically, a move in the argumentation stage that is “dialectically 
allowed, and serves the arguer’s rhetorical interest with greatest effectiveness”(van Eemeren, 
2010, p. 43). 
When arguing conductively, besides giving reasons for the conclusion, the arguer chooses 
to explicitly offer some counter-considerations against it, while at the same time maintaining the 
conclusion to be unqualified, i.e., leaving it without any modification. By doing so, the arguer 
makes her argument appear to be more solid, and improves its persuasiveness. Therefore, in a 
conductive argument, the specific maneuver that has been strategically performed is the purposive 
mentioning of some counter-considerations in such a way that just makes them appear to be 
trivial. Arguably, this consists of the most important feature that needs to be accounted for when 
analyzing a conductive argument. By adopting the theoretical tools pertaining to strategic 
maneuvering, however, making use of a conductive argument could be further analyzed into three 
aspects: topical potential, audience demand and presentational devices, all of which will be 
helpful in explaining its particular mechanism in achieving an optimal persuasiveness. 
For the first, any use of a conductive argument involves a choice carefully made from the 
topical potential at the arguer’s disposal. When arguing conductively, the arguer not only chooses 
from a great number of positive considerations to construct an argument for the conclusion, but 
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more importantly, she also selects prudently only some of the available counter-considerations to 
be mentioned. The number of counter-considerations has to be limited, and their contents will 
always be restricted to points that count apparently and directly against the conclusion. For 
example, objections or doubts to the positive reasons given in the argument will be excluded. 
Moreover, the counter-considerations that are to be mentioned also need to be meaningful. In 
general, only those considerations that are (recognized as) worthy taking into account, and could 
potentially or actually be known by the audience, will be considered for mentioning. Accordingly, 
when those particularly selected negative points are offered along with the positive reasons, and 
after their value being recognized, it leaves to the audience an impression that the arguer really 
knows about the topic well, and has already thought about it in a thorough way. At the same time, 
the arguer herself will also be very likely to be perceived as an honest, objective or open-minded 
person, because it appears as though she is willing to take into account both favorable and 
unfavorable considerations in order to present a more candid and less biased appraisal of the 
conclusion. These effects would in turn contribute substantially to boost the arguer’s credibility in 
audience and thereby enhance the chances of persuading them.  
For the second, any use of a conductive argument involves an intentional adaption to meet 
the audience demand. Generally, when there is a need to argue for some claim to someone, it just 
means that this claim is controversial at the present stage, and that particular person is possibly or 
actually having some doubt or objection against it. In other words, the addressee of an argument 
will normally be preconditioned with an initial skepticism, and in many cases, she might already 
have had in hand some reasons against the claim to be argued. However, as indicated above, the 
counter-considerations to be mentioned in a conductive argument need to be meaningful in such a 
way that they are very likely to be recognized as considerable, or known to be worthy 
consideration, by the audience. In this connection, it is not surprising for us to find that, in many 
instances of conductive argument, the counter-considerations included are usually some points 
whose existence and significance are already quite familiar to the audience. It is quite rare to see a 
conductive argument containing a counter-consideration that is not commonly known, or a 
counter-consideration that makes no sense in the eyes of the audience. Therefore, by deliberately 
mentioning those specific counter-considerations, the arguer not only shows her respect for the 
audience’s skeptical attitude and their opposing views, she also manifests explicitly her 
acknowledgement of their value and importance in thinking about the issue in question. This could 
easily be recognized as some concession that the arguer has made to her audience, which would in 
turn establish some communion between them. As a result, the arguer may have successfully 
reduced the audience’s confrontational orientations, and increased the possibility of persuading 
them.  
For the third, any use of a conductive argument involves the exploitation of a special 
presentational device. There are indeed different possible ways to include a counter-consideration 
in an argument. It could be mentioned and then further discussed, for example, by explaining its 
truth, relevance, or its justificatory power. More often than not, a counter-consideration is 
mentioned in an argument for assessment, and sometimes especially for refutation. However, in a 
conductive argument, counter-considerations are simply mentioned in a non-refutational way, in 
which no attempt is made to scrutinize them or to remove them. On the contrary, they have been 
juxtaposed straightforwardly with the supporting reasons in a particular comparative manner, by 
using an even-though-like clause (including “even though”, “although”, “notwithstanding”, or 
“nevertheless” etc.). As indicated before, the use of these conjunctions just joins two propositions 
in a rhetorically unequal way with exactly opposite orientations, where the proposition in the 
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clause has been downplayed in importance, while the other is particularly emphasized (Hansen, 
2011, p. 44). Presenting counter-considerations in such a delicate way, then, imposes to the 
audience an assumption of some outweighing-relation between the reasons for the conclusion and 
the counter-considerations against it, and thereby leaves to them an impression that the arguer has 
some good reason to believe the conclusion is certainly defensible against those counter-
considerations. Consequently, the audience would be oriented to recognize that the counter-
considerations are weaker, wrong or no longer viable, or their importance has already been 
eliminated somewhere else for some possible reasons, even though the arguer has provided 
nothing to actually account for these judgements. As a result, the audience’s own attitude towards 
the conclusion may be changed, and she might become more apt to accept it, especially when she 
doesn’t really have a good grasp of the justificatory power in those counter-considerations. 
 
6. Conductive argument as a mode of strategic maneuvering: Its evaluation 
 
Moreover, it is also feasible, and to some extent promising, to evaluate conductive arguments by 
treating them as a mode of strategic maneuvering and thereby adopting the corresponding 
normative standards. In the extended pragma-dialectical framework, strategic maneuvering is 
performed by an arguer in order to achieve effectiveness through reasonableness, however, “the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order to ensure effectiveness do not necessarily always agree 
with the conditions that have to be met to guarantee reasonableness” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 41). 
Consequently, in cases of strategic maneuvering where the arguer’s pursuit of effectiveness 
overwhelms her commitment to reasonableness, they will “derail” into fallaciousness (van 
Eemeren, 2010, p. 198), for each instance of strategic maneuvering is basically a move made in 
the argumentative discourse, and every such move is primarily required to meet the dialectical 
norms of reasonableness. Therefore, “each mode of strategic maneuvering has in principle 
unreasonable, i.e., fallacious, counterparts” (van Eemeren, Garssen, & Meuffels, 2012), and “all 
derailments of strategic maneuvering are fallacies in the sense that they violate one or more of the 
rules for critical discussion” (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 198). 
Seeing from this point of view, then, the evaluation of a conductive argument would 
become much simpler if it is taken to be a particular mode of strategic maneuvering: a conductive 
argument is good when its use as an argumentative move doesn’t violate any rule of critical 
discussion, while it is bad when its use as an argumentative move violates at least one rule of 
critical discussion. In general, any use of a conductive argument consists of a twofold effort: 
offering some reasons for the conclusion to establish its acceptability, and mentioning some 
counter-considerations against the conclusion to achieve an optimal effectiveness through 
persuasion. As a result, the uses of conductive argument could violate the rules of a critical 
discussion in several different ways.  
On the one hand, things could go wrong in arguer’s endeavor to adduce reasons for the 
conclusion. For example, she might possibly bring into discussion some claim that has not been 
granted by the other party, thus violate the starting-point rule. She might also afford some reason 
that is not relevant to the conclusion, thus violating the relevance rule. Moreover, she could 
possibly violate the validity rule by using some reason to support the conclusion by means of an 
invalid form of reasoning, or violate the argument scheme rule by applying an argument scheme 
incorrectly. 
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On the other hand, there could also be possible violations of critical discussion rules in the 
arguer’s endeavor to mention counter-considerations, and it is in these cases that we could detect 
the most common and significant fallacious counterparts of conductive arguments.  
First and foremost, it has been revealed that by presenting counter-considerations in a 
particular comparative manner in a conductive argument, the arguer just imposes to the other party 
an assumption of some outweighing-relation which in turn makes those counter-considerations 
appear to be trivial. In this connection, the arguer’s use of a conductive argument could violate the 
starting-point rule, if the outweighing-relation assumption to be imposed simply fails the 
intersubjective identification procedure, i.e., it has not been granted by the other party. For 
example, consider the following argument coming from a student, who is asking the teacher to 
save him from the final exam that he has just failed in a terrible way: 
 
Even though I didn’t do well in the final exam, you should still consider letting me 
pass this course, because I really worked hard on this course for the whole 
semester, and did learn something in this course. 
 
When arguing in this way, obviously the student has taken for granted that the efforts made 
in a course, and the fact that a student will have acquired something from that course, could 
together outweigh a terrible failure in the final exam. However, it is easy to see that the use of this 
conductive argument could hardly work, simply because very few teachers would agree to take 
that assumption as acceptable. Hence it should be judged as a fallacious move violating the 
starting-point rule.  
For the second, the use of a conductive argument could also violate the relevance rule, if 
the mentioned counter-considerations are indeed not relevant to the conclusion. To illustrate this 
point, let us consider the following example taken from Govier’s textbook A Practical Study of 
Argument (2010): 
 
The American Revolution was not a typical revolution. For one thing, the people 
in revolt were mainly middle class or upper class–not peasants. For another, the 
object of attack was something far away–a government in England–not the close 
structure of the society in which the war occurred. Despite the fact that it is called 
a revolution, and despite its great importance for the history of the world, the 
American Revolution should not be thought of as a model for other revolutions. 
(p. 367) 
 
In this conductive argument, the arguer has just presumed some relevance between the fact 
that “the American Revolution has great importance for the history of the world” and the view that 
“the American Revolution should not be thought of as a model for other revolutions”. Therefore, 
she has decided to mention the former as a counter-consideration against her conclusion. 
However, as Govier (2010) has revealed, this counter-consideration is indeed not relevant, 
“because the importance of the events for world history has nothing to do with this issue of 
whether a revolution was typical or not” (p. 413). As a result, the use of this conductive argument 
violates the relevance rule, and should be judged as a fallacious move.1 
                                                        
1 However, it is worth noting that Govier’s final verdict about this argument is positive, i.e., she thinks the argument is 
to be judged as good, for it could still satisfy the standards of Acceptability-Relevance-Goodness of grounds. This 
difference could be useful for further exploration of the discrepancies between logical norms and dialectical norms.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
The concept of conductive argument captures a special way of arguing that is commonly 
recognized in our argumentative practice, but has long been overlooked in our argumentation 
studies. It really is a challenging task to explain why we collected both positive and negative 
considerations into one structure, and how it works to establish a standpoint and to achieve 
persuasion. Other than searching for a logical or epistemological account, this paper offers a 
pragma-dialectical point of view to understand the use of conductive argument. Based on a 
rhetorical perspective on conduction, it is contended that the introducing of counter-considerations 
in a conductive argument is mainly for some rhetorical concerns, particularly in order to achieve 
better persuasiveness in audience.  
This interpretation establishes a linkage between conductive arguments and strategic 
maneuvering, and opens a possibility to theorize conductive argument as a particular mode of 
strategic maneuvering. It is argued that the use of conductive arguments could be analyzed and 
evaluated in an adequate way by adopting the theoretical tools pertinent to strategic maneuvering 
developed in extended Pragma-Dialectics. Accordingly, it is suggested that the special mechanism 
and the complex structure of conductive arguments could be well explained from a perspective 
other than logic, hence the appeal for treating them as a new type of argument is not necessary, if 
not problematic. 
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